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Considering Individual Religious Freedoms
Under Tribal Constitutional Law
Kristen A. Carpenter*
Environment, culture, religion, and life are very much interrelated.
Indeed, they are often one and the same. Water for example, is the
lifeblood of the people. I recall taking a draft tribal water code for
public input into the five villages .... Protection of the water spirits
was a major concern throughout the reservation. And the water spirits
were varied, depending whether the water source was a river, lake, or
spring. I reported back to the attorneys and they laughed at my
findings. However it was no laughing matter when an elderly Cheyenne
with a rifle kept [a] drilling team from crossing his water spring.
"Today is a good day to die," he said as he held his own hunting rifle
before him. I defended him in tribal court the next morning and I cried
with him when he told me how the water spirits sometimes came out and
danced in the spring.I
- Gail Small, Northern Cheyenne
As American Indian nations revitalize their legal systems, there is renewed
interest in "tribal law," that is, the law of each of the Indian nations. 2 Today, there is a
particular focus on the subject of "individual rights" under tribal law.3  In tribal
contexts, people are highly interested in the legal institutions and rules that govern
their lives, especially as many tribal communities are experiencing a period of great
political, social, and economic change. 4 At the national level, the Supreme Court
repeatedly expresses concern about whether individuals, especially non-Indians, will
be treated fairly in tribal court.5 For scholars, individual rights under tribal law raises a
number of issues including the potential tension between individual rights and the
collective interests and cultures of Indian tribes, 6 the relationship between federal and
tribal law as sources of individual rights,7 and the meaning of tribal sovereignty in the
contemporary era.8 For those outside the Indian law field, the question of American
Indians' individual rights in tribal settings seems to inspire reflection on the broader
question of individual rights under law. 9
This article attempts to contribute to the discussion about individual rights
under tribal law by examining the specific area of individual religious freedoms. In
particular, it explores, in the religious freedoms context, an emerging scholarly
consensus that the presence of individual rights in tribal settings represents the
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assimilation of tribal law, institutions, and peoples. After examining historical and
contemporary sources on individual freedoms under tribal law, the article concedes
that the scholarly critiques offer important cautions. It argues, however, that tribes
may be able to implement constitutional provisions on individual religious freedoms in
ways that enhance tribal communities and advance sovereignty.
Part I acknowledges the challenge of discussing American Indian religions in a
legal article. Part II sets forth series of hypothetical scenarios meant to exemplify
some of the individual religious freedoms claims that might arise in tribal settings.
Part III discusses sources of law, including the federal First Amendment and Indian
Civil Rights Act, to determine whether they support claims for individual religious
freedoms brought by tribal members against tribal governments. 10 Because, as this
Part explains, such disputes are most likely to-be decided by tribal courts applying
tribal law, it ultimately focuses on religious freedoms provisions found in tribal
constitutions. In Part V, the article outlines scholarly concerns about individual rights
under tribal law, especially the critique that individual rights effectuate the assimilation
of American Indians and harm tribal sovereignty. It explores this critique, and
responses to it, in light of the various examples of tribal constitutional religious
freedoms provisions discussed in Part Ill. The article concludes in Part V with some
thought about how tribes can, and do, effectuate religious freedoms in ways that
protect both individual interests and tribal sovereignty.
I. WRITING ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Religious freedom and American Indian religious practices are sensitive
subjects.'1 This is true for a number of reasons. First, the word "religion" may be a
misnomer when we are talking about tribal peoples' spiritual experiences. In its
Western sense, "religion" means "the service and worship of God or the supernatural"
or "a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and
practices.'' 12  But across the many tribal cultures and languages, different
understandings may be operative. For example, the Cherokee Nation offers the word
"dinelvlodi" as a direct translation of the English word "religion". 13 But according to
Jace Weaver, a scholar of religious studies, there is another Cherokee word, "eloh,"
that is "sometimes translated as 'religion' and also simultaneously means "'history,'
'culture,' 'law,' and 'land."' 1415
In many Native cultures, religion is inseparable from relationships and rituals,
from stories and place. 16 In a Navajo setting, for example, it may be more appropriate
to conceptualize an entire way of living in harmony with one's surroundings, relatives,
and circumstances - rather than a discrete "religion." 17 James Zion, former Solicitor to
the Courts of the Navajo Nation, explains: "One of the fundamental principles of
Navajo life is the phrase sa'ah naaghai bik'eh hozho which has been translated as 'the
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conditions for health and well-being are harmony within and connection to the
physical/spiritual world.' 18 So one problem is that even in talking about "religion,"
we may be missing something from tribal contexts.
In addition to the semantic problem is the tendency to misrepresent or
misappropriate tribal religions and sacred information. There exist among hundreds of
tribes different religious practices and traditions, but they have been poorly
understood. 19 Former Cherokee Nation Principal Chief, Wilma Mankiller, argues that
it is "because of the dearth of accurate information about Native people [that]
stereotypes persist, particularly with regard to spirituality." 20 But on the other hand,
when scholars try to move beyond stereotypes and examine religion in specific tribal
settings, they risk violating cultural privacy norms. Tribal religions may dictate that
religious and cultural traditions be kept confidential among members, clans, societies
or practitioners within the tribal community.2' In addition to internal privacy norms,
some tribal religions have gone underground as a result of historical and contemporary
threats.
Indeed, discussions about tribal religions and religious freedoms are inevitably
shaped, in many ways, by American Indians' history of religious persecution.2 3
European monarchs and explorers, Christian organizations, and the United States
government itself, have all. undertaken specific and sustained practices designed to
eradicate American Indian religious practices. 24  These have included U.S. army
massacres of people engaged in religious dances, federal laws criminalizing Indian
religious practices, federally funded programs assigning Christian missionaries to
reservations, the removal of Indian children from their families to Christian boarding
schools, and other programs tied closely to the federal project of conquering,
colonizing, and assimilating American Indians.25 As recently as 1988, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the federal government's decision to build a road through
an American Indian sacred site even though it would "virtually destroy" the Indian
religion. 2
6
Thus, the subject of contemporary individual religious freedom occurs against a
backdrop of religious oppression and the larger project of colonization. Scholarly
discussions must acknowledge that many traditional tribal religions are still vulnerable
and the question of individual religious "freedom" may be highly charged in the
context of communities that have been so harmed by outside religions, governments,
and citizens. The struggle of tribal religions to survive against external threats may be
more immediately pressing than questions of individual rights against tribal
governments. 2
7
Yet, the topic of whether tribes have religious freedom is important to some
tribal citizens who have brought claims asserting rights to religious freedom.28 It also
may be important to tribal governments as they develop and reform their law and
governing institutions.29 This article thus addresses the issue of religious freedoms, but
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with an awareness of the challenges described above. Where possible, it comments on
the legal experiences of specific tribes, and tries not to over-extrapolate. It avoids any
information that the author knows to be private or confidential. Instead of discussing
details of tribal ceremonies or practices, it focuses on the law, relying primarily on the
published constitutions of tribal nations. With respect to the historical backdrop, the
article makes observations about instances where individual claims might threaten
tribal cultural and religious revitalization efforts, and ultimately leaves to tribal leaders
and members the tribal-specific decisions about where and how to draw the lines. It
uses the word "religion" in its common sense, to refer to major world religions like
Christianity, and also to refer to the ceremonial practices, spiritual beliefs, and cultural
lifeways of American Indians.
II. SOME HYPOTHETICAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS CASES
To suggest the type of cases where individual religious freedoms issues might
manifest in tribal settings, this section presents a series of hypothetical stories having





A ceremonial rattle is about to be repatriated to the Winomee Indian Nation
from a federally funded museum.32 The tribal Cultural Resources Commission draws
up.a repatriation plan, intending to restore the rattle to the traditional medicine society
that historically took cared for and used the rattle in ceremonies. But right before the
rattle is to come home to the reservation, a leader in the local Native American Church
("NAC"), which has had a presence on the reservation for about fifty years now,
petitions the Commission for shared custody of the rattle. The NAC leaders believe
that the holy rattle has a place in their religion too. The Commission denies the
request. Can the NAC leader sue the tribe for violating its religious freedom?
Hypothetical B
Amelia Sandstone is a member of the Winomee Indian Nation. In 2004, the
Nation proposes to store nuclear waste on land within the reservation boundaries.
33
The proposed storage location adjoins land on the reservation that was historically
considered sacred and where a small number of tribal members still go for private
retreat, prayer, and ceremony. Amelia has brought her concerns to the tribal council.34
The council members reject her concern, saying the land in question has not been an
important ceremonial site in generations 35 and, in any event, the tribe desperately needs
the fees the federal government will pay for storage. Amelia believes that the waste
564
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will nevertheless contaminate and desecrate a sacred site. Can Amelia sue for
violation of her religious freedoms?
Hypothetical C
Frankie Bear is a member of the Winomee Indian Nation. He grew up on the
reservation, and then earned a B.A. and M.B.A. from top universities. He worked for a
long time in corporate America, but moved back to the reservation several years ago
and has enjoyed two successful terms on the tribal council. When the tribal chief
decides not to seek re-election, Frankie wants to run for the position. But traditionally,
only members of a certain Winomee religious society could serve as chief.36 Frankie's
family is not in that particular religious society. Even though he has complied with all
other requirements, the Tribal Registrar of Elections refuses to put Frankie on the
ballot, because he is not a member of the society.3 7 Can Frankie sue the tribe for
violating his individual religious freedom?
Hypothetical D
Anna Belmer is a member of the Winomee Indian nation. She is a devout
Christian who believes very sincerely that traditional Winomee ceremonies are, at best,
superstitious. Anna's daughter Sarah attends a tribally-run elementary school on the
reservation. In the spirit of cultural self-determination, the school starts to offer a
"tribal language and culture class." 39 In it, the teacher shares information about
traditional tribal ceremonies, stories, songs, and their meanings. Sarah comes home
brimming with these lessons -- to the secret delight of her grandmother. But Sarah's
mother is furious and believes that the tribe, through the school, is forcing traditional
Winomee religion on her daughter. Can Anna sue the tribal council for violating her
individual religious freedom?
III. THE LAW
The question is whether these individuals would have viable legal claims for
violations of their religious freedoms. The minds of most Americans probably jump
immediately to the deeply ingrained text and principles of the First Amendment 4° of
the United States Constitution: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."4 1 Indeed, if the
federal government or a state government committed the above-described acts, the
individuals would probably have First Amendment claims.
In the first two hypotheticals, the individuals might sue under the Free Exercise
Clause, 42 arguing that the government, by denying access to the rattle or desecrating
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the sacred site -- substantially infringed on their ability to practice their religion.43 In
the last two hypotheticals, involving religion as an eligibility requirement for tribal
officials and the teaching of tribal religion in the schools, the individuals might have a
claim under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, an argument that the state
imposed religious belief on them.44
None of the hypothetical plaintiffs would necessarily win their cases. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the Free Exercise Clause often denying
religious freedoms protections for American Indian religious practitioners. 45 But the
general idea is that if federal or state action were involved, the above-described facts
could give rise to actionable First Amendment claims. For several reasons, however,
the hypothetical plaintiffs may not have actionable First Amendment claims against a
tribal government. This section examines federal judicial decisions denying First
Amendment relief to individual Indians claiming that their tribal governments had
infringed on their religious freedoms, and then examines to what extent, if any, the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 affects the availability of such claims.
A. Applicability of the First Amendment to Indian Nations
As a general matter, the U.S. Constitution does not restrict the powers of tribal
46governments. The Supreme Court explained in Talton v. Mayes, "the powers of
local self-government enjoyed by [an Indian tribe] existed prior to the Constitution,"
and these powers are not subject to the limitations on the federal and state governments
contained in the Constitution. 47 Several cases in the religious freedoms area illustrate
this principle.
The Tenth Circuit case of NAC v. Navajo Tribal Council concerned a challenge
to a Navajo Nation ordinance criminalizing peyote on the reservation.4 ' The
legislation provided:
Whereas ... use [of peyote] is not connected with any Navajo religious
practices and is contradiction to the traditional ceremonies of the
Navajo people: therefore be it resolved that as far as the Navajo people
are concerned peyote is harmful and foreign to our traditional way of
life: be it further resolved that the introduction into the Navajo country
of the use of peyote by the Navajo people be stamped out and
appropriate action be taken by the Tribal Courts to enforce this action.
49
The ordinance levied punishment of nine months labor or a fine of $100 against
anyone convicted of sale, use or possession of Peyote.
50
Navajo members of the Native American Church sued to enjoin the anti-peyote
ordinance on grounds that it violated freedom of religion under the First Amendment.
5 1
566
Considering Individual Religious Freedoms
They lost because the federal district court found the U.S. Constitution inapplicable to
the Navajo Nation. The Court explained, "the First Amendment applies only to
Congress," and while the Fourteenth Amendment made it applicable to states, the same
was not true of tribes.52 The Court held that unless Congress specifically extended
provisions of the Constitution by statute to tribes, they remained inapplicable. 53 This
was true because tribes had a "higher status than that of states" and had surrendered to
the U.S. only to the extent explicitly provided in a treaty or statute.54 Even though the
tribal laws clearly had some impact on the freedom of religion, the federal court had no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
In 1967, the Navajo tribal council ultimately decided to adopt a legislative
provision in favor of the freedom of religion and specifically abolish the prohibition on
55peyote. As Ann Beeson has pointed out, "the irony of this set of events seems
incredible given the latest treatment of peyotism in the American courts.' '56 Beeson
refers, of course, to Employment Division v. Smith, in which the United States Supreme
Court denied First Amendment relief to members of the Native American Church who
were denied state unemployment benefits after being fired for taking sacramental
peyote in contravention of state law. 57
While NAC v. Navajo Nation remains the leading federal case on the
inapplicability of the First Amendment to tribal governments, another case also
deserves mention. In Toledo v. Publo de Jemez,58 tribal members who were Protestant
sued their tribal government in federal district court alleging violations their religious
freedom. The claims were that because of their Protestant faith, the government had
denied these members the right to bury their dead in the community cemetery, the right
to build a church on Pueblo land, the right to have missionaries, and the right to use a
communal wheat threshing machine. 59 The plaintiffs further claimed that the Pueblo
government had "threatened them with the loss of their birthrights, homes and personal
property unless they accept the Catholic religion." 6° All of these transgressions had
occurred, the Protestant members alleged, even though the Pueblo had legislative
provisions ensuring the freedom of religion. 6 1
Unlike the NAC v. Navajo Nation plaintiffs, the Pueblo plaintiffs brought their
claim primarily under the Civil Rights Act providing for liability where any person
acting under color of state or territorial law deprives another of "rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 62 The court found that the tribal
government officials could not have acted under New Mexico law because the Pueblo
was under the guardianship of the United States. Moreover, the court recognized "the
Pueblos do not derive their governmental powers from the State of New Mexico ...
indeed.., the powers of an Indian tribe do not spring from the United States although
they are subject to the paramount authority of Congress. ' 63
Following NAC and Toledo, it appeared tribal plaintiffs had little, if any, basis
for bringing religions freedoms lawsuits against tribal governments in the federal
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courts. The only possibly alluded to by the courts was that Congress might enact
some legislation authorizing such suits.6 Congress seemed to take some steps in that
direction when it enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
B. Religious Freedoms Under the ICRA
The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 extended to tribal governments a number
of the U.S. Constitution's limitations on federal and state governments. 65 In part,
legislators were responding to cases like NAC and Toledo where it appeared Americans
Indians had little legal basis for securing individual rights against tribal governments.
66
But Congress was also acting out of a more general concern about the legitimacy and
fairness of tribal courts, particularly, as some scholars have argued, with respect to
non-Indians living on reservations. Finally, Congress may have been moved by the
growing interest in civil rights for racial minorities in the 1960's, although ICRA,
unlike other civil rights legislation of the era, does not offer American Indians any
protection against civil rights violations by state and federal actors.
6 8
Often described as the "Indian Bill of Rights," ICRA does not literally extend
the federal Bill of Rights to tribal governments, but does include a number of very
similar protections.69 Most relevant for this article is ICRA's equivalent of a free
exercise clause, stating: "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall
make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 70 ICRA does not,
however, contain any equivalent of the establishment clause." Congress omitted an
establishment clause "out of respect for the religious-based governments of the
Pueblos of the southwest."
72
At first glance, ICRA would seem provide a potential basis for individual free
exercise claims (and other individual rights) against tribal governments. 73 But, as the
Supreme Court explained in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, relief under ICRA is
limited by its very narrow enforcement mechanism.74 In Santa Clara, Julia Martinez
challenged an ordinance of her tribe that denied membership and other rights to
children of female members who married a nonmember of the tribe, while affording
the same rights to children of male members who married a nonmember. Martinez
sued in federal district court, alleging the membership ordinance violated ICRA's
equal protection provisions.75
The Supreme Court held that ICRA provided no basis for jurisdiction in the
case. First, ICRA does not generally waive tribal sovereign immunity,76 nor does it
"authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its
officers." 77 In fact, the only federal remedy ICRA provides is a habeas corpus petition
to the federal court for individuals held in custody by a tribe.78 As the Court observed
in Santa Clara, Congress had "two distinct and competing purposes" in enacting
ICRA: In addition to its objective of strengthening the position of individual tribal
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members vis-a-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the well-established
federal policy of furthering Indian self-government. 79 These policy rationales are
certainly applicable in the religious freedoms arena. To the extent that issues of
religion go to the heart of tribal culture and lifeways, they certainly implicate self-
government and sovereignty. As a practical matter, many judges outside of the tribal
court system "may not be familiar with the role of religion in the tribal courtroom or in
a tribal court decision."
80
For all of these reasons, a federal or state court is unlikely to find jurisdiction to
hear an individual's religious freedom claim based on ICRA. Habeas jurisdiction will
not typically be helpful to individuals making religious freedoms claims, unless
perhaps a tribe takes the unlikely step of detaining or banishing members based on
their religious affiliation.8 ' By contrast, as Professor Catherine Struve has
demonstrated, the ICRA is often enforceable in tribal courts - either because a tribal
court has held Indian Civil Rights Act waives sovereign immunity and creates a cause
of action in tribal court, or because tribal statutory or constitutional provisions have
done the same.82 Many tribes allow suits against tribal officials for declaratory and
injunctive relief with respect to claims under civil rights laws or the tribal
constitution. 83 Some tribal courts apply ICRA in a manner consistent with tribal law
and custom, recognizing that "the ICRA grants to tribal members rights comparable to
those contained in the Bill of Rights, [but] that the meaning and application of the
ICRA is not determined by Anglo-American constitutional interpretations." 84 In still
other tribes, "tribal constitution or statutory law provides protections similar to the
ICRA with the result that the tribal court may grant relief under the tribal-law
provision without deciding whether relief is also available under the ICRA."85 Not all
86tribal courts have accepted the applicability of ICRA, but "this question is often
academic because many tribes have, to varying degrees, waived immunity from suit on
civil rights claims.8
7
Thus an individual who seeks to lodge a religious freedoms claim against a
tribal government is most likely to have her case heard if she brings it in tribal court. 88
The tribal court, in turn, is likely to apply tribal law to decide the claim - either alone
or in conjunction with the ICRA. For these reasons, individual claimants will need to
be knowledgeable about the available tribal law on religious freedom. The next
section discusses some examples of religious freedoms provisions found in tribal
constitutions.
C. Religious Freedoms under Tribal Constitutions
Indian tribes may provide for religious freedoms in their statutory, decisional,
regulatory, or customary law. This section focuses individual religious freedoms
appearing in tribal constitutions. This article does not attempt to survey each of the
569
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several hundred tribes with written constitutions, but rather discusses several examples
of tribal constitutional approaches to religious freedoms. 89 It groups these into four
categories: (1) constitutions with religious freedoms language that references,
incorporates, or tracks the ICRA, (2) constitutions that do not use ICRA but echo U.S.
principles of individual religious freedom, (3) constitutions with unique language on
religion, clearly expressing distinct tribal values and norms, and (4) constitutions that
do not reference religion or related concepts at all.
In the first group are tribal constitutions with religious freedoms provisions that
reference, incorporate, or track the language of the ICRA. Several of these explicitly
incorporate and set forth the ICRA. For example, the Crow Tribe's constitution
provides: "In accordance with Title II of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (82 Stat.
77), the Crow Tribe of Indians in exercising its powers of self-government shall not:
(a) make or enforce any law prohibiting the full exercise of religion."9 Other tribal
constitutions have a section on the "Rights of Indians" that tracks the language of the
Indian Civil Rights Act without referencing it explicitly. Tribal constitutions in this
group, such as that of the Mississippi Choctaw Band of Indians, provide that the
"Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, in exercising powers of self-government shall
not: (a) Make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion."91 Still
another group references and incorporates the ICRA without restating the rights
guaranteed therein. For example, the Cherokee Nation provides, "The appropriate
protections guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 shall apply to members
of the Cherokee Nation. '92 The Miami Tribe's constitution sets forth:
The Miami Tribe, in exercising its powers of self-government, shall not
take any action which is in violations of the laws of the United States as
the same shall exist from time to time respecting civil rights and civil
liberties of persons. This article shall not abridge the concept of self-
government or the obligations of the members of the Miami Tribe to
abide by this Constitution and the ordinances, resolutions, and other
legally instituted actions of the Miami Tribe. The protections
guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (82 Stat. 78) shall
apply to all members of the Miami Tribe.93
Interestingly, while this constitution broadly protects individual civil rights, perhaps
even those above and beyond ICRA's guarantees, it seems to balance these against
tribal "self-government" and tribal members' "obligations."
In the second group are tribal constitutions with religious freedoms provisions
that do not reference, incorporate, or track the ICRA, but still seem to echo the familiar
language and principles of the federal First Amendment. For example, the Big Lagoon
Rancheria Constitution provides: "no member shall be denied freedom of... religion.
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or other rights guaranteed by applicable federal law." 94 The Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation provides: "All members of the... Tribe... may enjoy,
without hindrance, freedom of. . . worship." 95 One special provision that recurs in a
number of constitutions, such as the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, is that "no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office of public trust in this
Nation. ' 96 Others such as the Muscogee Creek Tribe of Oklahoma, have a similar
statement declaring all citizens have the right to vote in tribal elections "regardless of
religion, creed, or sex." 
97
In the third group are tribal constitutions with unique language on religion,
clearly expressing distinct tribal values and norms. Some of these speak in terms not
only of individual, but also of collective rights and objectives. Some expressly
reference not only religion but also Indian tradition and culture. Still others have very
specific protections for their tribal ceremonies. The Yup'ik People of Bill Moore's
Slough, in the "Land Policy and Constitution of the People of Bill Moore's Slough,"
are very clear in their "Statement of Intent" about the collective nature of tribal rights
and the relationship between land, tradition, and culture.98
We the Yup'ik people of Bill Moore's Slough being the original
inhabitants of our land, having been placed here by our creator, to be
the keepers of our land and having maintained this land as our creator
intended us to keep it since the beginning, hereby declare our intent to
continue managing it as we have always managed it in the past.
In the past as well as the present our land and the culture of our people
have been intertwined to the point where it would not be possible to
maintain our traditional values and lifestyle should our land be
alienated, alterated or otherwise changed from its traditional
relationship with our people.
Therefore, it is our intent and the intent of this policy to maintain our
land for all time forever for traditional uses.
Furthermore, while others may attempt to change or eliminate our
culture by methods of separating our people from our land, let it be
known that we will resist such attempts.
Let there be no misinterpretation nor ambiguities in this policy, it is a
policy dedicated to the preservation of our traditional values, culture
and lifestyle that we have maintained since the beginning.
Carpenter
As a further point of clarification it is the position of Bill Moore's
Slough that our people would not have survived as a people without
maintaining our traditional relationship with the land. Therefore let this
written land policy be considered by all parties concerned to be not only
en integral part of the constitution of the people of Bill Moore's Slough
but to be the primary law of our people and the basis for our cultural
survival. 99
Having articulated the relationship between land, tradition, and survival, the Bill
Moore's Slough Constitution then sets forth specific limitations on government and
rights of individuals:
Article I
A) The Bill Moore's Slough Elders Council shall pass all resolutions
and laws dealing with land issues in conformity with the Bill Moores
Slough Land Policy.
B) The Bill Moore's Slough Elders Council shall protect, preserve and
defend the Bill Moore's Slough land, land policy and its people's
traditional relationship with the land to the best of its ability.
Article II
A) The Bill Moore's Slough Elders Council shall pass no laws
jeopardizing certain freedoms and rights deemed to be given our people
by our people's creator. Amongst these freedoms and rights are:
the freedom to government by and for the people; the right to speak
ones Conscience; the right to an education relevant to ones way of life;
freedom from want, hunger, pain and fear; the right to liberty; the right
to be Yupik; all rights guaranteed by Federal law including but not
limited to Title II of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.100
The Poarch Creek Constitution speaks in terms of tribal interest, connecting religion
and community survival, explaining that the purpose of the tribal government is to:
(1) Continue forever, with the help of God our Creator, our unique
identity as members of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, and to Poarch
identity from forces that threaten to diminish it;
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(2) Protect our inherent rights as members of a sovereign American
Indian tribe;
(3) Promote our cultural and religious beliefs and to pass them in our
own way to our children, grandchildren, and grandchildren's children
forever;
(8) Insure that our people shall live in peace and harmony among
ourselves and with all other people.'
0 1
It is in this context that the Poarch Creek Constitution then affords its members "the
right to exercise the tribal rights and privileges of members of the Poarch Band of
Creek Indians where not in conflict with other provisions of this Constitution, tribal
laws and ordinances, or the laws of the United States."'10 2
Of particular interest is the "Constitution of the Iroquois Nations or The Great
Binding Law, Gayanashagowa."' 0 3 The Iroquois Constitution is notable in that the
Constiutional protections seem to be for the religion itself, and the people have
responsibilities. In a section called "Religious Ceremonies Protected," the Iroquois
Constitution provides:
99. The rites and festivals of each nation shall remain undisturbed and
shall continue as before because they were given by the people of old
times as useful and necessary for the good of men.
100. It shall be the duty of the Lords of each brotherhood to confer at
the approach of the time of the Midwinter Thanksgiving and to notify
their people of the approaching festival. They shall hold a council over
the matter and arrange its details and begin the Thanksgiving five days
after the moon of Dis-ko-nah is new. The people shall assemble at the
appointed place and the nephews shall notify the people of the time and
place. From the beginning to the end the Lords shall preside over the
Thanksgiving and address the people from time to time.
101. It shall be the duty of the appointed managers of the Thanksgiving
festivals to do all that is needed for carrying out the duties of the
occasions.
The recognized festivals of Thanksgiving shall be the Midwinter
Thanksgiving, the Maple or Sugar-making Thanksgiving, the Raspberry
Thanksgiving, the Strawberry Thanksgiving, the Complanting
573
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Thanksgiving, the Corn Hoeing Thanksgiving, the Little Festival of
Green Corn, the Great Festival of Ripe Corn and the complete
Thanksgiving for the Harvest.
Each nation's festivals shall be held in their Long Houses.
102. When the Thanksgiving for the Green Corn comes the special
managers, both the men and women, shall give it careful attention and
do their duties properly.
103. When the Ripe Corn Thanksgiving is celebrated the Lords of the
Nation must give it the same attention as they give to the Midwinter
Thanksgiving.
104. Whenever any man proves himself by his good life and his
knowledge of good things, naturally fitted as a teacher of good things,
he shall be recognized by the Lords as a teacher of peace and religion
and the people shall hear him.
104
The Iroquois Constitution, given to the people by Dekanawidah, 1° 5 makes clear that the
people must fulfill duties to ensure the perpetuation of the ceremonies. Indirectly, of
course, the duty of the people to protect the ceremonies ensures there will be
ceremonies in which individuals can participate. Viewed in this light, the constitution
could be read to provide an individual right to religious practice, but the more obvious
focus of the provisions on festivals and ceremonial events seems to be on
responsibilities. And while various other sections of the constitution outline rights of
the people, including "lords," "war chiefs," and people from "foreign nations," these
are similarly framed in terms of collective duties and welfare, and in the context of the
Great Law. To understand this constitution more fully, we would need to see it in
practice and consult with tribal leaders and members about its meaning. But, on its
face, this constitution expresses the interconnected nature of people's rights and
duties."'
Finally, there are tribal constitutions without any express provision on religion.
Some of these, however, such as the White Mountain Apache Constitution, refer to a
"freedom of conscience" that may encompass religious belief.10 7 Moreover, some
tribes deal with religious issues in their legislative codes. The Colville Constitution,
for example, has no provision on religion, but the Colville Tribal Civil Rights Act
contains a free exercise provision.' 0 The White Mountain Apache code offers
extensive protection for sacred sites within the reservation. 109
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Still other tribes, like the Navajo Nation, do not have written constitutions, like
the Navajo Nation. Tribes without written constitutions might have (a) other written
law, such as tribal codes, on religion, (b) oral or customary law on religion, or (c) no
written or oral law on religion at all.
IV. CONSIDERING THE ASSIMILATION CRITIQUE
The above examples suggest at least four tribal constitutional approaches to the
freedom of religion: (1) constitutions that track or incorporate ICRA, (2) constitutions
that do not use ICRA but echo U.S. principles of individual religious freedom, (3)
constitutions with unique language on religion, clearly expressing distinct tribal values
and norms, and (4) constitutions that do not reference religion or related concepts at
all.' 0 Here this article considers possible ramifications of these approaches.
In a recent article, Professor Carole Goldberg points out that "[miost
contemporary scholars concerned with what may be called tribal revitalization - the
strengthening of political and cultural sovereignty for Native nations - treat individual
rights as an impediment to achieving that objective, not a positive tool.""' Surveying
leading scholars, she cites Professor Robert Porter who describes "the introduction of
individual rights into tribal litigation" as "fatal to tribalistic norms" and "therefore
damaging to tribal sovereignty."' 1 2 Similarly Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle argue
"that individual rights requirements imposed on Indian nations transpose societies
which understand themselves 'as a complex of responsibilities and duties' into
societies 'based on rights against [the] government and [eliminate] any sense of
responsibility that the people might have felt for one another.""' 3 Finally, Goldberg
points out, Professor Kevin Washburn has argued that "the introduction of individual
rights into tribal justice systems tended to standardize the cultures of Indian
nations."1
14
Certainly Goldberg and the other scholars are onto something - particularly
with respect to the tribal constitutions that repeat the principles, or even the very
words, of the Indian Civil Rights Act and federal First Amendment. Given the federal
government's historical involvement in the adoption of some tribal constitutions,
particularly through legislation such as the Indian Reorganization Act of 1924 and the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, it is hard to deny the possibility that many tribes'
individual religious freedoms provisions were initially imposed by the federal
government. 15 Today, such provisions may displace tribal values in favor of Anglo-
American norms, have a homogenizing effect on tribal government, and ultimately
harm tribal sovereignty. It is somewhat challenging to test the scholars on these points
because there are few readily accessible tribal court opinions applying individual
religious freedoms provisions. 116  However, by relying on judicial decisions and
secondary sources, this part of the article will first explore ways in which tribal
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constitutions with individual religious freedoms may indeed represent assimilation and
be harmful to tribal sovereignty. It will then consider alternative explanations and
ramifications for the presence of individual religious freedoms in tribal constitutions.
A. Individual Religious Freedoms as Representing and Effectuating Assimilation
This section will consider the possibility that individual religious freedoms may
represent and effectuate assimilation in several ways. First, the United States' versions
of individual religious freedom embodied in ICRA and the First Amendment may be
too narrow, or just a bad fit, for tribal worldviews and cultures. As discussed earlier,
the U.S Supreme Court has, in several cases, denied First Amendment relief to
American Indian religious practitioners seeking protection against acts by the federal
government. In Employment Div. v. Smith, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute
denying unemployment benefits to an employee and member of Native American
Church terminated for peyote use. 117 The Court found no violation of the federal Free
Exercise Clause because the law was facially neutral and generally applicable, even
though the law effectively punished Smith for practicing his religion. Then in Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 19 the court held the First Amendment
did not prevent the federal government from bulldozing, timber harvesting, and
building a road through a sacred site. The Court explained that the First Amendment
only prohibited government actions that "coerced belief."' 2 ° It did not protect specific
practices. Moreover, the First Amendment could not stop the government from doing
what it wanted with "its land."'' In Lyng, therefore, there was no free exercise
violation even though the government action would "virtually destroy" the Indians'
religion. '22
Thus, the federal First Amendment does not seem to protect religions that are
place-based or require certain ritual activities - limitations that are very problematic
for Indian religious practitioners. 123 To return to the hypotheticals, a tribal
constitutional provision modeled on the First Amendment might not stop the Winomee
Tribe from storing nuclear waste on a sacred site within the reservation as in
Hypothetical A. Of course, this would depend on the tribal court's interpretation and
application of the religious freedom provision. A tribal court may very well depart
from the narrow conception of Free Exercise propounded by the Supreme Court, and
choose instead to interpret an ICRA-like provision consistent with tribal norms, 124 as
discussed further below. On the other hand, scholars have documented the tendency of
some tribal courts to follow relevant federal or state law, even when it conflicts with
tribal custom. 125 ,
A second potentially assimilative effect of constitutional religious freedoms
provisions is that with their focus individual rights, they may ignore the duties of tribal
• 126
people and the collective nature of their religious experiences. In fact, neither the
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ICRA nor the federal Free Exercise clause has any statement of individuals' religious
or cultural duties to each other at all. In tribal contexts, this omission may be
problematic. As Dean Suagee has written:
Carrying on traditional tribal traditions is more than the freedom to
choose, more than the right to "enjoy" one's culture. The culture and
religion must be passed down through the generations or the culture and
religion cannot survive, and this means that some people in each
generation are obligated to perform certain roles.
127
The very survival of Indian cultures and religions is about the duty of some individuals
"to act out of responsibility to their cultures, their peoples" more than it is about "the
freedom of individuals to choose to believe."'128 Similarly, Vine Deloria has argued,
"[t]here is no salvation in tribal religions apart from the continuance of the tribe
itself."' 129  Effectively linking collective responsibility with individual freedom,
Suagee succinctly explains that "[i]f some people do not accept responsibility for
carrying on the culture and religion, others will not have the freedom to choose the
tribal religion because it will no longer exist. ' 13
°
There are many examples of tribal people's collective duties to maintain and
practice religious for the benefit of the entire community. Some of these come from
classic anthropological literature that, while often lacking an indigenous perspective,
offers some potentially useful information.131 Ruth Underhill writes of Hopi religion:
No individual need seek a vision. His welfare was wrapped up with the
welfare of the village and that was assured by the calendric round of
ceremonies. Even the priest need not seek individual power. Power
had been given to his clan or, perhaps, to the ruling family in his clan,
long ago. What he had to do was to carry through the rites without error
and to lead an upright life, free from quarreling or breach of taboo.
132
On the hunting ceremonies of Plains' Indians, Underhill explains that these were
undertaken to ensure food for the people and maintenance of humans' relationship with
the natural world. Individuals had duties not only to each other, but to the animals and
plants:
"Hunting is a holy occupation," said the Naskapi. So was the gathering
of plants, the cutting of trees, even the digging of clay. For these
Nature Persons had long ago offered their "flesh" for Indian use - but
on certain conditions. Every step in obtaining the flesh must be taken
with care and ceremony, or the gift would be withdrawn. 133
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Underhill also describes the Sun Dance of the Plains' people as occurring "for the
general welfare" of the people. 1
34
Contemporary accounts of Indian religious practices also reflect their collective
and relational qualities. Writing about religious practices of Northern California
Indians, one district court explained:
The religious power these individuals acquire in the high country lends
meaning to these tribal ceremonies, thereby enhancing the spiritual
welfare of the entire tribal community. Medicine women in the tribes
travel to the high country to pray, to obtain spiritual power, and to
gather medicines. They then return to the tribe to administer to the sick
the healing power gained in the high country through ceremonies such
as the Brush and Kick Dances.
1 35
These ceremonies and dances provided the 'World Renewal' essential to the tribes'
religious belief system, 136 making the Supreme Court's ultimate decision not to protect
them in Lyng particularly hard to understand. 1
37
Some contemporary indigenous leaders describe ceremonies that not only
require cooperative behavior, but have as their primary purpose and effect the renewal
of relationships. As Wilma Mankiller explains, "The Creator provided us with
ceremonies to remind us of our place in the universe and our responsibilities as human
beings."' 138 With respect to Cherokee practices, she recounts:
Each year one Cherokee ceremony in a series was conducted in each
settlement for the explicit purpose of rekindling relationships,
requesting forgiveness for inappropriate conduct during the previous
year, and cleansing the minds of Cherokee people of any negative
thoughts towards each other .... The primary goal of prayer is to
promote a sense of oneness and unity.
139
A number of tribes emphasize the collective, relational nature of religion in their laws.
The Iroquois Constitution described above offers a detailed example. In other tribes,
legislation fills the same purpose. For example, a Navajo Nation Resolution provides:
This religion, Beauty Way of Life, holds this land sacred and that we,
the Navajo People, must always care for it. Through this sacred
covenant, this sacred ancestral homeland is the home and hogan of all
Navajo people. Further, if the Navajo left their homelands, all prayers
and religion would be ineffective and lost forever.
140
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In still other tribes, these principles may be enforced through unwritten customary law,
the expectations and teachings of families, clans, and societies. In any of these
settings where a key purpose of the religion or spiritual practice is to achieve harmony
for the community, it may be that the assertion individual rights threatens the fabric of
tribal life - or just seems beside the point.
A third application of the assimilation critique is that the ICRA and Free
Exercise Clause may fail to reflect the history of suppression of Indian religions. As
described above in Part I, religious and governmental institutions collaborated to
Christianize and civilize Indians from contact through the better part of the Twentieth
Century.14 1 These programs, occurring alongside the broader project of colonization,
142threatened the very existence of tribes. This history means that today, the survival
of tribes might hinge more on the collective recovery and revitalization of Indian
religions -- including the maintenance of a land base, the instruction of young people
in ritual duties and tribal language, and the repatriation of sacred items -- than on the
right to maintain an individual belief system. 3 Moreover, some Indian communities
may remain vulnerable to the powerful influence of outside religious institutions. In
Hypothetical C, the individual who wants to be tribal chief would personally benefit
from a First Amendment lawsuit to put him on the ballot, and the tribe might even
benefit from his political, corporate, and academic expertise. But these benefits might
be achieved by sacrificing the tribe's need for a cultural leader at this stage of the
revitalization process.
A fourth point is that providing for religious freedoms claims against a tribal
government may be inconsistent with tribal institutions and structures. Perhaps
religious issues are meant to be handled by elders, clan mothers, or religious society
leaders. 14 Providing a basis for a legal claim in tribal court might undermine these
traditional bases of authority and decision-making, and vest power in a body that is not
experienced or able to handle spiritual matters. In the hypothetical with the sacred
rattle, one can imagine the challenge for tribal judges who may not be fluent speakers
of the tribal language, well-versed in tribal custom, or enjoy access to the generations
of community knowledge necessary to fully understand or decide the issue.
While questions of qualifications could sometimes be addressed through
judicial selection processes or training programs, tribal courts are usually still
adversarial in nature - casting parties in oppositional roles, fomenting argument, and
deciding a "winner" and "loser.' 45  Particularly when it comes to religious matters,
the fabric of tribal life may be better served by respecting the traditional structures of
dispute resolution and the religious or cultural leaders able to resolve religious or
cultural disputes in a way that maintains community norms. 146
Finally, the sheer symbolism of adopting the ICRA or First Amendment
wholesale may undermine the revitalization of tribal law and societies. At the most
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extreme end, one scholar has argued that tribal people might reframe the struggle for
sovereignty away from maintenance of a kinship-based way of life and towards the
acquisition of Western-defined rights. 147 Contemporary stories of tribes "disenrolling"
long-time tribal members, perhaps out of a desire to limit distribution of economic
development proceeds, would seem to be an example. 48 In addition to harming
individual and tribal members, reliance on Anglo-American rights could have
institutional effects as well. The importance of tribal courts is articulated partly in
terms of their specialized knowledge of tribal customary law and culture. 149 If tribal
law and culture becomes less distinctive, some might argue that state or federal courts
could just as easily apply Anglo-American legal principles, thereby diminishing the
perceived need for tribal courts.
1 50
There are probably additional ways in which importing the ICRA or Free
Exercise Clause might be evidence of assimilation and ultimately bad for tribal
sovereignty. But the article next turns to a few reasons why the existence of
individual religious freedoms might not be evidence of assimilation and/or bad for
tribal sovereignty.
B. Non-Assimilationist Explanations for, and Ramifications of, Tribal
Constitutional Provisions on Individual Religious Freedoms
151
This section considers the possibility that tribal constitutions with individual
religious freedoms provisions may be animated by principles and practices other than
assimilation. First, some tribes may have long-standing values in favor of individual
rights generally. Among the Hopi and Zuni, for example, "there is a strong belief that
adult individuals are ultimately free to act as they see fit and are not to be judged by
other humans for their actions.... In Hopi, this respect for individual freedom is
expressed by the phrase, 'Pi um pi' or 'it's up to you. ' 152  This respect for
individualism exists alongside the "obligations and duties toward one's kin ...
necessary for the proper order of Hopi or Zuni society.' 53 In the Navajo tribe, there is
a core value that "no one and no institution has the privilege to interfere with
individual action unless it causes an injury to another or the group."'154
The above examples have to do with individual freedoms generally. But it is
also possible that tribes historically accommodated or even encouraged individuals'
religious freedom. While tribes should not be bound to the practices of any particular
point in history, 55 "[t]radition plays a very important role" [in contemporary questions
of Indian governance] since it lays out values and presents social and cultural
justifications." 156 Therefore it may helpful to situate contemporary individual religious
freedoms against several examples from ethnographic and historical sources. The
discussion relying on these sources is not meant to replace careful study of tribes' own
laws, but rather to inspire tribal-specific research of this nature. Tribal members and
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leaders will need to assess for themselves the extent of individual religious freedoms
under traditional and contemporary tribal legal systems.
Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel's The Cheyenne Way presents in
the form of case studies certain data on Cheyenne lawmaking froml820-1880. 5 7 In a
case called The Tribal Ostracism and Reinstatement of Sticks Everything Under His
Belt, Llewellyn and Hoebel recount the story of Sticks Everything Under His Belt who
declared, "I am hunting for myself," thereby breaking tribal rules against individual
hunting. 158 The tribal chiefs met to decide how to handle Sticks Everything Under His
Belt and ruled that "no one could help [him] in any way, no one could give him smoke,
no one could talk to him.' 59 Anyone who violated this ruling would have to give a
Sun Dance. 60 After some years passed, a brother-in-law "took pity" on Sticks
Everything Under His Belt and pledged a Sun Dance "to bring him back in." 161 The
chiefs agreed and Sticks Everything Under His Belt promised to abide by tribal rules.
When it came time to have the Sun Dance, a young man named Black Horse who was
ashamed to show his usually handsome face because he had a growth on it, asked the
chiefs if he could "sacrifice himself' alone up in the hills. 162 The chiefs sent Black
Horse to the brother-in-law who pledged the Sun Dance, saying it was his decision.
The Sun Dance pledger initially denied the request saying, "you know my rule is that
all must be there. ' 163 But Black Horse made his case for doing the ceremony his own
way: "Well, brother-in-law, won't it be all right if I set up a pole on the hill and hang
myself to it through my breasts? I shall hang there for the duration of the dance. ''1
The pledger still demurred, saying the chiefs had agreed everyone must act together.
When Black Horse suggested that the pledger handle the situation by making
"everyone. . . swing from the pole," the pledger finally compromised, saying, "No,
that was not mentioned in the meeting. If you want to swing from the pole, that is all
right, but no one else has to unless he wishes to."1 65
The case is interesting because the Sun Dance was ordered as a remedy to bring
wholeness and repair to this community where one individual had acted in a deviant
manner. Even against this backdrop, and the leaders' clearly stated concern that
everyone be bound by tribal rules, the Sun Dance pledger had the authority and
flexibility to allow another individual to fulfill the ceremony in his own way (perhaps
because of a determination that it would not harm the group).166  The story is
instructive also because it seems to indicate room for individual rights so long as
individuals abide by tribal procedures. Sticks Everything Under His Belt had
unilaterally declared his intent to hunt for himself, thereby declaring himself "a man
out of the tribe." But, by contrast, Black Horse presented his individualized request
first to the "head chiefs" and then to the Sun Dance pledger, ultimately securing
permission in a way sanctioned by the tribe. 167 If this story can be read to implicate
Black Horse's individual religious freedoms, it appears that the tribe was able to
accommodate his individual interests in a way that preserved tribal order and harmony.
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As Llewellyn and Hoebel conclude, "When they had the Sun Dance everyone had a
good time. Black Horse was the only one on the pole, and there were so many in the
lodge that there was not room enough for all to dance."'
168
Another example comes from the Dakota ethnographer, Ella Cara Deloria, who
wrote extensively about her Dakota people, emphasizing above all else the relational
nature of tribal life: "One must obey kinship rules: one must be a good relative. No
Dakota who has participated in that life will dispute that. In the last analysis every
other consideration was secondary - property, personal ambition, glory, good times,
and life itself."'169 These rules are enforced by social norms and expectations, as well
as a group of "magistrates."' 170 Spirituality infuses all aspects of the story, and Deloria
writes movingly of the Dakota Sun Dance that "might vary in minor details from band
to band, but in essentials was all the same .... For there was brought together, into
one great religious event, the fulfillment of all the vows that men in their distress had
made in the preceding year; there were also the corporate prayer's for the tribe's well-
being were offered, in tears."
171
But even in this culture of relatives, kinship, and communal ceremony, Deloria
describes individual interactions with the sacred. In her fictionalized, though
ethnographically rich work, Waterlily, she recounts the experience of Bluebird whose
daughter is dying. Bluebird engages in her own private ceremony to save the baby:
She knew she must make some sacrificial offerings. Fumbling in her
haste, she muttered to herself, "Is that right? Alas, what do I know
about it? Those who know tell of the Something Holy - Taku Wakan -
that has supreme power, but I never understood. It is so remote. What
right have 1?172
Despite this doubt about her "right" to make in an offering, Bluebird does her
best to follow what "everyone knew" about spiritual matters. 173  She goes off,
decidedly on her own except for the sick baby, and makes a prayer. Deloria describes
painstakingly Bluebird's attempts to go to the correct place and make the correct
offering. Finally she finishes the private ceremony and steps back: "Right or wrong,
that was her prayer. Overwhelmed by her daring, she stood motionless, waiting - for
what, she did not know. Presently someone said in her ear quite clearly, 'Hao!' It was
the Dakota word of approval and consent.' ' 174 Immediately the baby is healed, and
Bluebird knows the Great Spirit has heard her. She prays to her relatives and takes the
baby back to camp.
175
This example suggests not that individual religious freedoms ever trumped
collective duties and experiences in Dakota life, but that in Ella Deloria's view, there
were times where individual religious experiences were necessary (and perhaps
tolerated), even if the individual was not sure he or she was following the rules.
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The above examples suggest that some tribes historically provided space for
individual religious freedoms and interests, within the duty-bound, relational nature of
the tribal community. Vine Deloria, Jr., the leading scholar writing at the intersection
of Indian religion and law (and Ella Deloria's nephew), captures the complex nature of
individual expression in the tribal community. 176 Deloria dismisses "the concept of an
individual alone in the tribal religious sense" as "ridiculous," given the
"interdependence of people" in tribal life. 177 But Deloria nonetheless accepts that
"Indian tribal religions have an individual dimension.'' 178 He points to the individual
experience in vision quests, dreams, and naming ceremonies, the designation of certain
individuals to become keepers of medicine bundles or leaders in the tribal religion. 79
For Indians, this individual experience has always been linked to the tribal
community - in sharp contrast, Deloria argues, to Christianity which has "the
individual as the primary' focal point and his or her relationship with the deity as her or
her primary concern." 18  In Deloria's view, Indian religions traditionally "supported
the individual in his or her community context, because they were community religions
and not dependent on abstracting a hypothetical individual from his or her community
context. One could say that the tribal religions created the tribal community, which in
turn made a place for every tribal individual.''
Individuals' interests in religious freedom or choice may also arise when new
religions arise in, or come to, tribal communities. Well-known examples include
Handsome Lake bringing a new religion to the Senecas, Is2 the arrival of the Ghost
Dance on the Plains, 183 and the spread of the Native American Church. 184 When these
religions reached tribal people, there were probably some conversations and struggles
about whether it was acceptable for members to practice the new, as opposed to old,
religion. Perhaps more research into these historical events could serve as a basis for
examining tolerance of religious freedom in indigenous communities. Certainly the
openness of some Indians towards Christian missionaries, and the Indians' surprise
about the missionaries' own closed-mindedness, suggests that some Indians tolerated
peoples who practiced religions different from their own. 185
The idea that Indians have mechanisms for accepting various religions and
individuals' choices about them seems to be reflected in contemporary experience.
Similarly, Former Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation Wilma Mankiller writes
about "traditionally minded" Indian women who practice both Christianity and tribal
religions. The late Cherokee elder Florence Soap, for example, recounted how she
experienced both types of religion:
I started going to church when I was about thirteen years old. We went
to church a lot. We used trails in the woods to walk to'and from church
... As Christians we are taught to love everybody because God wants
us to love each other. When I was well, I would go to the hospital and
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sit with people or cook for people. God taught me that. We also went to
Cherokee Stomp Dances and we used traditional Cherokee medicine.
My mother-in-law, Molly Soap, taught me a lot about medicine. I used
to help her gather medicine in the woods. She was a good woman and a
good healer who lived to be more than 110 years of age.
86
LaDonna Harris tells about her Comanche grandparents' experiences with religious
freedom:
My grandfather took me and my grandmother to church, and he would
sit outside because he did not accept church teachings. He would sit
outside and wait for us. That evening he would be singing peyote
songs. He was a powerful man who could cure certain kinds of
illnesses with his Indian medicine ... When I asked him if it bothered
him that the church preached against the Native American Church and
peyote, he said no one should try to take away anyone else's religious
beliefs. He said it would be harmful to everyone involved to try to take
away the religious beliefs of others.' 
87
These women acknowledge the harmful, divisive, and assimilative history of
Christianity in tribal communities. 18 8 Some express a strong preference for tribal
traditions. 189 However, at the same time, they are able to draw from, understand, and
tolerate Christianity and other religions. 190 For some, it is the tribal religion itself that
facilitates such tolerance. Linda Arandayo describes: "I've had to wrestle with the
concept of Christianity and what churches and religions did to our people, but then
Christ's messages are not violent. I finally made peace with all that. When my family
comes back to Oklahoma for the Green Corn Ceremony at Hillubee Stomp Grounds,
we take medicine together ... We let go of all negative things, get well together, and
get into a good relationship with the world."
191
While each tribe has its own values, a commonality seems to be that tribal
religious traditions emphasize communal duties and experiences, 92 but also allow for
individual freedom and expression.' 93 As LaDonna Harris explains, "One of the things
I respect about Comanche spirituality is there is no hierarchy or rigid structure. There
are common beliefs, including that of a Creator, but each individual finds his or her
own way to that place."' 94 This principle would seem to reflect a basis for individual
religious freedoms.
Even the express incorporation of ICRA or the First Amendment may represent
the always changing nature and dynamism--not just the assimilation--of tribes. How
can this be possible? First of all, as suggested above, some tribes have long-standing
value in favor of individual freedoms, limited only when the exercise of individual
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rights would harm the group.' 9 5 But, even if individual legal freedom is a relatively
new concept, it makes sense for tribal people to evolve as all people do. When the
Framers adopted the United States Constitution, the freedom of religion meant the
right to be a Puritan, free from persecution by the Church of England; it soon came to
mean the right to practice various kinds of Christianity; and today, it ostensibly means
the right to practice anything from Buddhism to Santeria. The fact that our
understanding of the freedom of religion has evolved and been affected by outside
influences does not make us less "American;" it just makes us changing Americans.
Tribal people have long had the experience of acquiring something new and
making it their own, whether a material item or intangible concept. For Kiowa people
maybe it was the horse, for Anishinabe women perhaps it was imported beads, for
Cherokees maybe it was the idea of written language. 196 It is possible that Indians, like
all peoples can recognize something useful from the outside, seize it, and remake it in
their own image. Perhaps the same can be true of the concept of individual religious
freedom.
Admittedly, Indians have often times not had a meaningful choice about what
to take from the outside. Examples include the arrivals of European disease and
Christianity itself. In many instances, it is impossible to deny the assimilative effects
of outside influences, such as the market economy and English language. Such
experiences have left tribes vulnerable, and individual choices to engage in non-tribal
religions may challenge tribal communities. In some tribes, the concept of individual
religions freedoms may seem particularly alien.' 9 7 Thus there is a possibility that
importing religious freedoms from Anglo-American law could, at its most extreme,
represent a neocolonial approach to tribal lawmaking, bringing the assimilationist
process right into tribal legal systems. 198
It is, nevertheless, at least worth considering that when American Indians have
borrowed individual freedom of religion from the ICRA or Free Exercise Clause, they
have managed to make it their own, in an act of dynamic sovereignty.199 Indeed, there
are a number of reasons, not fully attributable to assimilation, why a tribe might want
an individual religious freedom provision in its constitution. 20 0 A tribal government
might ascertain that its members expect individual religious freedom and the tribal
government is stable enough to provide it.20 The tribe may decide that it is important
for the tribal legal system to have readily observable indicia of democratic
principles, 202 particularly in an era where the Supreme Court is restricting the
jurisdiction of tribal courts over concerns (whether grounded in reality or not) about
the treatment of non-Indian litigants. 20 3 In some cases, the modern rise to power of the
tribal council may necessitate protections for individual members that were not
required when tribal government was less centralized. 2° In others, customary law and
institutions may have been irretrievably lost, leaving tribes with the need for law to fill
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in the gaps. Perhaps a tribe needs to assure religious freedoms (or duties) in response
to particularized events in the history of the tribe.
20 5
In the final analysis, the particular reason for adopting individual religious
freedoms may be relatively unimportant - so long as the tribe has been able to make a
meaningful decision for itself. As tribal law experts Justin Richland and Sarah Deer
have argued:
A tribal nation can choose to adopt a nontraditional legal principle as
part of their tribal law (perhaps because it most closely matches the
ways in which at least some members live their lives), and this does not
necessarily violate their sovereign authority. In fact, it is the very
essence of the sovereignty of any nation to choose what legal
principles--traditional or nontraditional--they wish to incorporate into
their law. 206
Whichever form of religious freedom provision appears -in a tribal constitution--and
even if it was originally imposed by the federal government--tribes can take steps now
to ensure that the application of such provisions reflects tribal norms and enhances
tribal sovereignty. One mechanism is to use tribal custom as an interpretive guide
when tribal courts interpret their constitutional provisions on religious freedoms.
207
While there are challenges associated with the use of customary law, including
"questions of authenticity, legitimacy, and essentialism," 20 8 tribes can rely on a
growing body of scholarship discussing customary law. 209 They can also turn to tribal
court decisions applying it. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court, in particular, has been
a leader in interpreting its legislative code consistent with Navajo customary or
common law. 2 1  In Navajo Nation v. Crockett, for example, the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court reviewed a freedom of speech claim in the context of Navajo custom
and tradition.21 The court observed:
[Navajo common law] provides that an individual has a fundamental
right to express his -or her mind by way of the spoken word or actions.
As a matter of Navajo tradition and custom, people speak with, caution
and respect, choosing their words carefully to avoid harm to others.
This is nothing more than freedom with responsibility, a fundamental
Navajo traditional principle.2 12
In other cases, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has articulated the importance of
interpreting its laws through the lens of tribal custom:
213
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As a sovereign Indian nation that is constantly developing, the Navajo
Nation must be forever cautious about state or foreign law infringing on
Navajo Nation sovereignty. The Navajo Nation must control and
develop its own legal system because the concept'of justice has its
source in the fabric of each individual society. The concept of justice,
what it means for any group of people, cannot be separated from the
total beliefs, ideas, and customs of that group of people.21
4
Under similar reasoning, a tribal court could interpret a constitutional provision on
religious freedoms consistent with tribal values and custom--instead of under the U.S.
Supreme Court's restrictive reasoning in Lyng or Smith.
In at least one case, Hoover v. Colville Confederated Tribes,215 a tribal court
has offered expansive protection to the tribal citizens' religious interests in lands. The
tribal constitution at issue contains no express provision on individual religious
freedoms, and individual religious freedoms are protected in the Tribal Civil Rights
Act.2 16  Hoover arises under the tribal regulatory code which the court interprets to
protect lands with ceremonial importance.
In Hoover, the Colville Court of Appeals upheld an injunction restraining a
non-Indian from developing property in "Hellsgate Reserve" within the reservation. 2 17
The individual had failed to comply with the Tribes' Land Use Ordinance and his
proposed development threatened to harm tribal religious interests. Thus, the case
218turned on the authority of the tribe to regulate non-Indian fee land. The trial court
had found the proposed land development, by harming tribal religious and ceremonial
practices, would have a direct effect on the "health and welfare of the tribe." 219
Plants and animals preserved through comprehensive management in
the reserve are not only a source of food, but also play a vital and
irreplaceable role in the cultural and religious life of Colville people.
Annual medicine dances, root feasts, and ceremonies of the Longhouse
religion all incorporate natural foods such as deer and elk meat and the
roots and berries found in the Hellsgate Reserve. The ceremonies play
an integral role in the current well being and future survival of Colville
people, both individually and as a tribal entity... It is well known in
Indian Country that spirituality is a constant presence within Indian
tribes. Meetings and gatherings all begin with prayers of gratitude to the
Creator. The culture, the religion, the ceremonies - all contribute to the
spiritual health of a tribe. To approve a planned development
detrimental to any of these things is to diminish the 'spiritual health of
the Tribes and its members. The spiritual health of the American Indian
is bound with the earth. Their identity as a people becomes invisible in
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the city, away from nature. It is the land and the animals which renew
and sustain their vigor and spiritual health.22°
Moreover, the trial court had found, "highly persuasive [evidence] that the
encroachment of human habitation would have a detrimental effect on the animals,
plants, and herbs used for sustenance, medicinal, and ceremonial purposes - the
continued existence of which is vital to the spiritual health of the Tribes and their
members. ' 221 Therefore, the appellate court upheld the injunction preventing the land
development. 222
Hoover offers several possible lessons. Proponents of the assimilation critique
might argue that Hoover only proves their point: the fact that it is not a case brought
under an individual constitutional rights model allows the court to conceive broadly of
the interests of the entire tribal community. 223 On the other hand, the court explicitly
recognizes individual interests in religious practice, explaining that "the ceremonies
play an integral role in the current well being and future survival of Colville people,
both individually and as a tribal entity.",224 Above all, Hoover reveals a tribal court
going beyond a Lyng-like approach and, instead, using tribal custom to recognize and
protect the relationship between land, ceremonies, and living beings. This is not a
tribal court confined to Anglo-American notions of justice.
A second mechanism for implementing individual religious freedoms in a way
that resists assimilation is to maintain institutions apart from tribal courts, such as
elders' councils and clan-based decision makers. 22 5 In one example, a Cheyenne
Arapahoe tribal court declined jurisdiction in a religious freedoms case, deferring
instead to the people and laws that traditionally governed such matters:
After issuing some initial orders which led to potentially violent
confrontations between the parties and tribal police, the District Court
of the Cheyenne Arapaho Tribes declined to exercise jurisdiction to
decide the rightful possession of sacred ceremonial items. The court
held that civil rights must be interpreted in the light of centuries of
customs and traditions, in ordering that the right of possession be
decided by Cheyenne tribal members, chiefs, and headsmen in
traditional dispute resolution procedures.226
Similarly, "disputes involving cultural beliefs and a failure to comply with custom are
the subject matter for bodies such as the Peacemaker Court in the Navajo and Seneca
Nations, the Court of Elders in the Sitka Community Association and the Northwest
Intertribal Court System. ' 227 To implement individual religious freedoms in a way that
comports with tribal custom, tribes can work to ensure that traditional decision-making
bodies retain decision-making authority over disputes involving religion and culture.
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A third approach would be for tribal lawmakers and citizens to engage in
constitutional reform22 8 with the specific and conscious goal of providing for religious
freedom in a way that avoids assimilation.2 29  Some of the tribal constitutions
discussed above may be helpful as models in the reform process. A tribe could follow
the Bill Moore's Yupik constitution and supplement boilerplate ICRA or free exercise
language with statement of tribal religious duties and broader context for the
realization of such rights. Alternatively, it could strike such language in favor of
providing only culturally-specific language, as the Iroquois constitution does. If
external or internal challenges to the tribal religion persist, a tribal constitution could
be reformed to include specific language addressing specific threats to the tribal
religion. The Salt River Pima-Maricopa Constitution, for example, has special
provisions about missionaries:
The liberty of conscience secured by the provisions of this constitution
and bylaws shall not be construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community. Persons who are not members of
the Salt River Pima- Maricopa Indian Community may not act as
missionaries or ministers of religion within the boundaries of the Salt
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community except upon proof satisfactory
to the community council that they are of good moral character and that
their presence within the reservation will not disturb peace and good
order. 3
°
The Fort Mojave Constitution also provides against outside threats: "Members shall
continue undisturbed in their customs, culture, and their religious beliefs, including,
but not limited to, the customs, ceremonial dancing and singing, and no one shall
interfere with these practices, recognizing that we have been a people and shall
continue to be a people whose way of life has been different." 231  Such substantive
provisions could also be enhanced by procedural reforms to ensure that jurisdiction
over religious matters rests in the appropriate forum.2 32
This section has described just three ways--using tribal custom as an
interpretive force, maintaining traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, and engaging
in constitutional reform--for tribes to implement individual religious freedoms in ways
that resist assimilation and enhance tribal sovereignty. In the final analysis, tribes will




Many indigenous peoples believe that spirituality is the key to their survival as
distinct peoples, and, for this reason, the law must treat tribal religious issues
carefully. 2 For the most part, religious freedoms cases arising on reservations will be
decided by tribal courts applying tribal law, either exclusively or in conjunction with
the ICRA. Today's tribal constitutions offer a number of different types of religious
freedoms provisions, ranging from language that parrots federal law to more culturally
distinctive, tribal-specific protections. At the same time, scholars express concerns
about the appearance of any individual rights in tribal constitutions. This article
agrees that the assimilation critique of individual civil rights is applicable in the
religious freedoms area and that the critique offers important cautions for tribal
citizens, judges, and lawmakers. Nevertheless, it remains possible that, through
conscious development and application of their laws, tribes can provide individual
religious freedoms in ways that reflect tribal norms and enhance sovereignty.
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relief under ICRA where complaint alleged that tribe's housing ordinance was used to retaliate
against the residents for their resistance against tribal leadership).
82. Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunityand Tribal Courts, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 137 (2004). See also
RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 260.
83. See Struve, supra note 82 at 157.
84. RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 269-70 ("The northwestern tribal appellate courts have
generally recognized that the ICRA is not intended to interfere with tribal traditions and
institutions.").
85. See Struve, supra note 82, at 157.
86. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 899 (The highest court of the Hopi tribe "has taken the position
that the Indian Civil Rights Act is not necessarily binding law".)
87. Struve, supra note 82, at 157.
88. Moreover, even if federal review may ultimately be available in a case arising on a reservation,
litigants are typically required to exhaust tribal remedies, see Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855-856 (1985) (the Supreme Court seems to be
rethinking the mandatory nature of the exhaustion rule with respect to non-Indian parties);
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (describing exhaustion as a "prudential
rule").
89. For a survey of civil rights provisions appearing in 220 tribal constitutions see Elmer R. Rusco,
Civil Liberties Guarantees Under Tribal Law: A Survey of Civil Rights Provisions in Tribal
Constitutions, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 269, 276-78 (1990).
90. Crow Tribal Constitution, art. XI, § 4 (2002), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.
org/ccfolder/crowconst.htm.
91. Constitution and Bylaws of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, art. X, § 1, available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/mississippi-choctawconst.htm (last visited Nov.
17, 2004).
92. Constitution of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, art. II, § 1 (1975), available at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/cherokeeconst.htm#a2. More fully this
constitution provides: 'The judicial process of the Cherokee Nation shall be open to every
member of the Cherokee Nation. Speedy and certain remedy shall be affirded under the terms
of this Constitution for every wrong and injury to person, property or reputation wherein said
remedy does not conflict with the laws of the United States. The Council shall prescribe the
procedures pertinent thereto. The appropriate protections guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 shall apply to all members of the Cherokee Nation."
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93. Constitution of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma, art. VII (1995), available at http://doc.narf.
org/nill/Constitutions/miamiconst/miamiconst.htm#artvii.
94. Constitution of the Big Lagoon Rancheria, art. IV (1985), available at http://doc.narf.
org/nill/Constitutions/lagoonconst/biglagconst.htm#art4.
95. Constitution and By-Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, art.
VII, § 3 (1937), available at http://doc.narf.org/nill/Constitutions/uteconst/uteconst.htm#Bill.
96. Constitution of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, supra note 99.
97. Constitution of the Muscogee Creek Nation, art. IV, § 2, available at http://thorpe.ou.
edu/constitution/muscogee/index.html
98. See Land Policy and Constitution of the People of Bill Moore's Slough (1988), available at
http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/billmoores/index.html.
99. Id. at Preamble.
100. Id. at Art I, II.
101. Constitution of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, Preamble, (Adopted June 1, 1985), available
at http://doc.narf.org/nill/Constitutions/poarchconstitution/poarchconsttoc.htm
102. Id. at art. II.
103. Constitution of the Iroquois Nations, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder/iroquoisconst.htm.
104. Id. at para. 99-104.
105. See id. at para. 1 ("I am Dekanawidah and with the Five Nations' Confederate Lords I plant the
Tree of Great Peace. I plant it in your territory, Adodarhoh, and the Onondaga Nation, in the
territory of you who are Firekeepers. I name the tree the Tree of the Great Long Leaves.
Under the shade of this Tree of the Great Peace we spread the soft white feathery down of the
globe thistle as seats for you, Adodarhoh, and your cousin Lords. We place you upon those
seats, spread soft with the feathery down of the globe thistle, there beneath the shade of the
spreading branches of the Tree of Peace. There shall you sit and watch the Council Fire of the
Confederacy of the Five Nations, and all the affairs of the Five Nations shall be transacted at
this place before you, Adodarhoh, and your cousin Lords, by the Confederate Lords of the Five
Nations.").
106. Similarly Rusco's study describes:
A number of provisions on religious freedom obviously were written
specifically for the situation of the tribe. For example, several refer to
traditional Native religious beliefs or practices. For example, the constitution of
the Miccosukee Tribe states that "[t]he members of the tribe shall continue
undisturbed in their religious beliefs and nothing in this constitution and
bylaws will authorize either the General Council or the Business Council to
interfere with these traditional religious practices according to their custom."'..
..While these two provisions dealing with religious freedom refer only to
traditional tribal beliefs, several other specific provisions stating freedom of
religion guarantee religious diversity. For example, the constitution of the
Pueblo of Laguna states, "All religious denominations shall have freedom of
worship in the Pueblo of Laguna, and each member of the Pueblo shall respect
the other members' religious beliefs."' The constitution of the Alabama-
Quassarte Tribal Town states that "no member shall be treated differently
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because he does or does not believe in or take part in any religion or religious
custom."' The constitution of the Cocopah Tribe says that "' the members of
the tribe shall continue undisturbed in their religious beliefs and nothing in this
Constitution will authorize the Tribal Council to interfere with religious
practices."'
Rusco, supra note 89, at 276-78.
107. Constitution of the White Mountain Apache Tribe of the Fort Apache Indian Reservation
Arizona, art. V, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/codes/wmtnapache/Constitution.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2004).
108. RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 265 (citing Colville Tribal Civil Rights Act, Ch. 1-5,
adopted Feb. 4, 1988, resolution 1988-76, certified Feb. 16, 1988).
109. See WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE GOVERNMENT CODE, ch. 8, PRESERVATION OF RELIGIOUS SITES
(1991) (designating religious sites within the White Mountain Apache Reservation for the use
of practitioners of the traditional religion and providing civil and criminal penalties for
desecration, including traditional Apache punishment), available at http://www.
tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/wht-mtn-apachetribalcode-govemment.html (last visited
June 23, 2004).
110. Again, for a broader survey of constitutional civil rights provisions,.including detailed analysis
of religious freedoms, see Rusco, supra note 89, at 275-76.
111. See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 889.
112. Id. (citing Porter, supra note 4, at 278).
113. Id. (citing Vine Deloria, Jr., & Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The past and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty 213 (1984)).
114. Id. (citing Professor Kevin Washburn, Remarks at the Arizona State University College of Law
Goldwater Lecture on American Institutions (Feb. 20, 2003)).
115. The history and development of tribal constitutions is beyond the scope of this article. For an
historical overview, see id., at 892-99. An interesting follow-up project might examine
whether and how the historical origins and circumstances of the adoption of a particular tribal
constitutional religious freedom provision seems to affect the way in which it is implemented
today.
116. While tribal court opinions are not as widely circulated or available as state and federal court
opinions, see Nell Jessup Newtom, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian
Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285, 294-95 (1998), they are available through several
electronic databases, in print sources such as the Indian Law Reporter, and by requesting copies
from tribal courts. That said, this article relies only on tribal court opinions available
electronically, primarily the National Tribal Justice Resource Center's searachable database of
tribal court opinions, available at, http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/legal/opfolder/
default.asp. It is possible that this article misses tribal court decisions on individual religious
freedoms that may be available through other resources.
117. Employment Driv., Dep't of Human Res. Of Or. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
118. Id.
119. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447-49.
120. Id. at 450-51.
121. Id. at 453.
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122. Id. at 451.
123. See WEAVER, supra note 14, at 180. Some scholars claim the First Amendment has difficulty
protecting any non-Christian religion. See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities
and The First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
222, 253 (2003) ("non-Christian religious outsiders," including Jews, Muslims, and American
Indians "have difficulty convincing the Court that their religious convictions are sincere and
meaningful").
124. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 439 ("Under Navajo tribal code, Navajo customary or
common law must be applied by Navajo courts where not prohibited by federal law.").
125. See Russell Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts: Possible? Desirable?, 8
KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 74 (1999).
126. See DELORIA, supra note 11, at 194 ("When we turn from Christian religious beliefs to Indian
tribal beliefs .... the contrast is remarkable. [Indian] [r]eligion is not conceived as a personal
relationship between the deity and each individual. It is rather a covenant between a particular
god and a particular community.").
127. Dean B. Suagee, The Cultural Heritage of American Indian Tribes and the Preservation of
Biological Diversity, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 483, 510 (1999).
128. Id.
129. See DELORIA, supra note 11, at 194.
130. Suagee, supra note 127, at 510.
131. This Article follows the approach of RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at xviii whose
INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES focuses on tribal law but refers to some "reports or
accounts from non-Indian anthropologists or historians. We realize that these accounts may not
always be consistent with the beliefs ... of Native peoples. We include them as a starting point
for discussing traditional [lawmaking]. We encourage readers ... to read critically and form
independent analysis of the passages.").
132. Ruth M. Underhill, Red Man's Religion, 209-10 (1965).
133. Id. at 116.
134. Id. at 142.
135. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 591-92 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
136. Id. at 592.
137. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458.
138. MANKILLER, supra note 1, at 15.
139. Id. at 16-17.
140. Navajo Nation Council Resolution CD-107-94 (Dec. 13, 1994).
141. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 1999) ("By
the late 19th Century federal attempts to replace traditional Indian religions with Christianity
grew violent. In 1890 for example, the United States Calvary shot and killed 300 unarmed
Sioux men, women and children en route to an Indian religious ceremony called the Ghost
Dance .... In 1892, Congress outlawed the practice of traditional Indian religious rituals on
reservation land. Engaging in the Sun Dance . . . was punishable by withholding 10 days'
rations or 10 days' imprisonment."). See generally Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy
Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native
American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 787-805 (1997) (recounting various acts
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by federal government and religious institutions, often acting together, that suppressed Indian
religions); John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native
Americans, 52 MONT. L. REv. 13 (1991) (same).
142. See, e.g., Lorie M. Graham, "The Past Never Vanishes:" A Contextual Critique of the Existing
Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 10-18 (1998) (on the federal government's
and missionaries' attempts to Christianize Indian children by removing them from their homes
and installing them in federal boarding schools where they had religious and other instruction
designed to "Kill the Indian and Save the Man."). Another notable, and frankly named, federal
policy was the government's "Termination" program. See DONALD L. Fixico, TERMINATION
AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960 (1968).
143. See, e.g., Mark A. Michaels, Indigenous Ethics and Alien Laws: Native Traditions and the
United States Legal System, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1565, 1571 (1998) ("Because Native
religions depend on the oral tradition for their transmission, the death of a language often
means the death of a religion. Stories and ceremonies are at the core of most, if not all, Native
religions, and these stories and ceremonies lose their context and meaning when translated.
This connection between language and ceremony was made explicit in a communiqu6 written
by the Traditional Circle of Indian Elders, a group that represents a number of different North
American Nations: "[L]ong instruction and discipline are necessary before ceremonies and
healing can be done. These procedures are always in the Native tongue; there are no
exceptions...."); MANKILLER, supra note 1, at 37 ("You have to be able to speak Cherokee to
be a Cherokee medicine person. How can you say the right words if you can't speak
Cherokee?) (quoting Florence Soap).
144. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 313-322 (on traditional dispute resolution forums).
145. See generally Porter, supra note 4 (on the incompatibility of adversarial Anglo-American legal
institutions and with indigenous societies and traditions).
146. Compare RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 323-331 (describing how Navajo Peacemaker
Court - while not necessarily a venue for bringing religious disputes - serves as an alternative to
tribal courts, fostering Navajo values and the restoration of relationships).
147. Compare Eric Cheyfitz, The Colonial Double Bind: Sovereignty and Civil Rights in Indian
Country, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 239-40 (2003) (tracing the "subversion of traditional
sovereignty by a tribal sovereignty generated within the colonial context that leads grassroots
groups such as the . . .Navajos in the Manybeads case to invoke a language of individual
rights (in this case the right to freedom of religion) in order to assert their traditional
sovereignty.").
148. See generally Brendan Ludwick, The Scope of Federal Authority over Tribal Membership
Disputes and the Problem of Disenrollment, 5 1- FED. LAW. 37 (2004).
149. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225
(1994).
150. The fallacy of such logic may become obvious if we were to consider telling Massachusetts
that its legal problems could be just as easily resolved by Connecticut courts, given the relative
similarity of the states' substantive law. The jurisdiction of both state and tribal courts should
be based on concepts of territorial sovereignty.
151. Goldberg considers a similar but slightly different set of responses to the assimilation critique.
See Goldberg, supra note 3, at 910-929 (considering the contentions that (1) "individual rights
are fully consistent with tribal cultures;" (2) "individual rights must be protected in order for
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tribal governments to secure economic growth and respect from non-Indian governments; (3)
"native nations need individual rights to protect them from congressional attacks on their
sovereignty and culture").
152. RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 239.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 240 (quoting James W. Zion in Civil Rights in Navajo Common Law on the Navajo
concept of "individualism").
155. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter and Ray Halbritter, Beyond the Ethnic Umbrella and the
Buffalo: Some Thoughts on American Indian Tribes and Gaming, 5 GAMING LAW REVIEW 311
(2001) (co-authored with Ray Haibritter).
156. Rebecca Tsosie, Introduction: Symposium on Cultural Sovereignty, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 7 (2002)
(quoting Dr. Duane Champage).
157. KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941).
158. See id. at 9.
159. Id. at 10.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 11.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 11-12.
165. Id. at 12.
166. Compare RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 240 (quoting James W. Zion in Civil Rights in
Navajo Common Law, "I suggest that the core of the Navajo concept of civil rights lies in the
maxim, "It's up to him.' It states a base Navajo value of individualism whereby no one and no
institution has the privilege to interfere with individual action unless it causes injury to another
or group.").
167. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 157, at 9-12.
168. ld. at 12.
169. See ELLA CARA DELORIA, WATERLILY X (1988). Deloria wrote in the 1940's but Waterlily
was not published until after her death.
170. Id. at 3.
171. See id. at 113.
172. ld. at 17.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 18.
175. Id.
176. Vine Deloria, Jr. (b. 1933) and Ella Cara Deloria (b. 1889) were both born into a prominent
Dakota family in which various relatives were leaders in traditional religion and Christianity.
Their ancestor Saswe was a medicine man, while both of their fathers were clergymen in the
Episcopal Church. Ella Deloria graduated from Colombia University and worked with the
famed anthropologist Franz Boas. She published a number of books, in English and Dakota.
Vine Deloria, Jr., graduated from Iowa State University, Lutheran School of Theology,
University of Colorado School of Law. He directed the National Congress of American
Indians and served as a professor of law, history, religious studies, and political science at the
University of Colorado. See VINE DELORIA, JR., SINGING FOR A SPIRIT: A PORTRAIT OF THE
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DAKOTA SIOUX (2000) (on the family's spiritual experiences and legacy).
177. DELORIA, supra note 11, at 195.
178. Id. at 196.
179. Id. at 196-97.
180. Id. at 198.
181. Id. at 197.
182. See Robert B. Porter, Decolonizing Indigenous Governance: Observations on Restoring
Greater Faith and Legitimacy in the Government of the Seneca Nation, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 97 (1999) (A major event in Seneca history occurred in 1799, when Handsome Lake, the
half-brother of the Seneca War Chief Complanter, had the first of a series of visions that not
only described the sorry condition of Seneca society at the time but also proscribed religious
and secular solutions. Handsome Lake was to have subsequent visions, which eventually
formed the basis of a social gospel and a new religion, the Gaiwiio.) Porter argues that the
Handsome Lake religion was itself an assimilationist force among Senecas, importing Quaker
and federal values, and disrupting traditional kinship patterns. Id.
183. A contemporaneous (though somewhat controversial by present-day standards) account can be
found in JAMES MOONEY, THE GHOST-DANCE RELIGION AND THE SIOUX OUTBREAK OF 1890
(1896) (reprinted 1973).
184. See generally STEWART, supra note 56.
185. DELORIA, supra note 11.
186. See MANKILLER, supra note 1, at 37 (quoting Florence Soap).
187. Id. at 26-27 (quoting LaDonna Harris).
188. See id. at 27 ("Some of the missionaries would come and preach in a way that was designed to
make us question our identity. The message was that if we gave up music, dance, and our
identity and then went to church, they might accept us. But they never accepted us.") (quoting
LaDonna Harris); id. at 30 ("Various Christian groups divided up the reservations
Christianity really disrupted the kinship unit.") (quoting Beatrice Medicine).
189. See id. at 35 ("I realized my own culture had more [than Christianity] to offer me as a human
being and as a woman. I learned that our Earth and all its elements are living entities to be
celebrated and honored.') (quoting Joanne Shenandoah).
190. See id. at 27.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 33 ("The emphasis is on the collective, for no one medicine person could emit the power
that the participating collective puts forth."
193. See id. at 33 ("Spirituality is a very private matter" that need not be demonstrated outwardly to
others). Navajo law goes so far as to confer property rights over one's religious materials. See
In re Estate of Apachee, 4 Nav. R. 178 (Navajo 1983) ("The court classifies property as
follows: A man is standing in an imaginary circle, and he has all his possessions - everything he
calls life. They are (1) his wife and children, (2) his religion (including its paraphernalia,
mountain dust, bundles, etc.) (3) his land, (4) his livestock and (5) his jewelry, including
money.").
194. MANKILLER, supra note 1, at 26.
195. See, e.g., James W. Zion, Civil Rights in Navajo Common Law, in RICHLAND & DEER, supra
note 67, at 240 (on the Navajo concept of "individualism").
196. Those familiar with American Indian literature might remember Kiowa author N.Scott
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Momaday's stories about the horse in THE WAY TO RAINY MOUNTAIN (1969), Ojibwe author
Louise Erdrich's beading scenes in THE ANTELOPE WIFE (1998), and Cherokee author Diane
Glancy's use of Cherokee syllabary in PUSHING THE BEAR (1996).
197. G. Peter Jemison, The Journey, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 433, 435 (1995) ("Our religion and our
government are entwined as one; we do not separate them and we do not call it religion. Rather
it is an Indian way of life that encompasses everything that we do.").
198. Thanks to Carey Vicente for suggesting this point about ongoing tribal vulnerability, especially
to Christianity, and the importance of evaluating "individual freedom" against this reality.
199. Compare Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural
Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REv. 69, 118-23 (2005) (urging tribes to protect cultural
property by enacting tribal laws that reflect tribal custom in an act of "living sovereignty").
200. See generally RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 283-288 (on the challenges of making law
meaningful in tribal communities today).
201. See id. at 284-285 (on the dangers of "reviv[ing] an aspect of the tribe's unique legal heritage"
while ignoring "contemporary norms, structures, and practices"); compare Goldberg, supra
note 3, at 934 ("The project of tribal revitalization cannot begin with denial of the cultural
changes and growing expectations regarding individual rights that have taken place within
Indian country.").
202. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons From the Third Sovereign, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1997) ("To
fulfill their role as an essential branch of tribal government, the tribal courts must provide a
forum that commands the respect of both the tribal community and the non-tribal community
including courts, governments, and litigants. To do so, tribal courts need to be perceived as
both fair and principled.").
203. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383-84 (2001) (Kennedy, Souter & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring) (about the "special nature" of tribal courts and potential effects on non-Indian
parties). As Carole Goldberg rightly suggests, pandering to such concerns may only further the
assimilationist goal of introducing Western-style courts to tribal communities. See Goldberg,
supra note 3, at 897-98.
204. See DELORIA supra note 11 (on the Hopi and Navajo tribal councils).
205. In Ann Beeson's version of the facts underlying NAC v. Navajo Nation, the Navajo tribal
council's enactment of the anti-peyote legislation was an act of resistance against John Collier,
the head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs at the time. Collier was pushing restrictions on sheep
grazing, an unpopular position with the Navajos, and also supporting of the peyote users. See
Ann E. Beeson, Dances with Justice: Peyotism in the Courts, 41 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1139
(1992). Beeson's work suggests the council's later decision to lift the peyote ban and provide
religious freedom should be examined in a broad historical context, querying what kind of
religious freedoms were available before, during, and after the peyote ban--rather than
assuming freedom of religion is merely a modern "import".
206. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 286.
207. See id. at 283-300 (on "bringing custom into the [tribal] courtroom"). But see Goldberg, supra
note 3, at 896-97 ("Despite the many differences among tribal cultures, and the assertions by
tribal courts that they were not bound to mimic non-Indian law, tribal court interpretations of
due process were remarkably similar to one another, as well as to non-Indian readings of the
requirement.).
208. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Custom, Tribal Court Practice, and Popular Justice, 25 AM. INDIAN L.
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REv. 117, 120 (2001).
209. See id.; Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom
in American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 287 (1998) Joseph A. Myers &
Elbridge Coochise, Development of Tribal Courts: Past, Present, and Future, 79 JUDICATURE
147, 147 (1995); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N. M.
L. Rev. 225, 226 (1994).
210. The courts of the Navajo Nation seem to lead the way in infusing their decisions with Navajo
custom and common law. See Barsh, supra note 124, at 74
211. Navajo Nation v. Crockett, 7 Navajo Rptr. 237, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6027 (Navajo S.Ct. 1996).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., In Re Validation of Marriage of Loretta Francisco, 6 Navajo Rptr. 134, 16 Indian L.
Rep 6113 (1989).
215. Hoover v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 3 CTCR 43, 6 CCAR 16, available at,
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/2002.NACC.0000004.htm.
216. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
217. See Hoover, 3 CTCR 43.
218. Id. The question of tribal authority over non-members, though beyond the scope of this Article,
is decided under the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 565 (1981) ("A tribe may regulate . . . the activities of non-members who enter
consensual relations with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements... a tribe may ... exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.")




223. The juxtaposition of Hoover and Lyng also suggests that in addition to interpreting tribal
constitutional provisions consistent with tribal custom, constitutional religious freedoms
provisions may be supplemented by land use and other codes that protect sacred lands and
resources.
224. Hoover, 3 CTCR 43, 6 CCAR 16 (emphasis added).
225. The Ho-Chunk Tribe, for example, has a "traditional court" with decisionmakers selected by
the clans and proceedings conducted primarily in Ho-Chunk, that hears matters implicating
culture and also serves as a resource on customary law. See Mary Jo B. Hunter, Tribal Court
Opinions: Justice And Legitimacy, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142 (1999). See also Ho-Chunk
Tribe at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/government.htm (providing the tribal constitution,
court system, and boards and committees of the nation).
226. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34
IDAHO L. REv. 465,496-97 (1998).
227. Valencia-Weber, supra note 208, at 251-52.
228. Many tribes are engaged in constitutional reform. See, e.g., Eric Lemont, Overcoming the
Politics of Reform: The Story of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma Constitutional Convention,
28 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (2003-2004) and sources described supra note 30.
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229. See RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 2, at 286 ("If, at a later time, members of the tribe come to
power that have a more traditional outlook, they might change the law to reflect that interest.
This, too, would be just another expression of the same sovereignty. Traditions themselves are
not necessarily static; they evolve and change over time.")
230. See Rusco, supra note 89, at 277-78.
231. FORT MOJAVE CONST., art. V, § 2 (cited in RICHLAND AND DEER, supra note 2, at 264).
232. See supra notes 224-46 and accompanying text.
233. Compare Goldberg, supra note 3, at 914 ("As former Navajo Nation President Peterson Zah
remarked, Indian peoples should be asked what an individual right is for them, .and should have
time to conduct a 'dialogue' regarding the meaning of such rights, so that each tribal
community can mold individual rights to suit its own cultural framework.").
234. See MANKILLER, supra note 1, at 27-28 ("Spirituality has sustained indigenous peoples since
time immemorial. With the incursions into and eventual takeover of our traditional homelands
by foreign interlopers, it has been the key to our very survival as a people.").
606
